We characterize the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations. 
Introduction
The study of TU-games with limited cooperation presented by means of a communication graph was initiated by Myerson (1977) , and an allocation rule for such games, the so-called Myerson value, was also introduced simultaneously. Later on, various studies in this direction were done in the past nearly forty years, such as Meessen (1988) , Herings et al. (2008) , van den Brink et al. (2011 ), van den Brink et al. (2012 , Béal et al. (2012) and Shan et al. (2016) . Among them, the allocation rule, named position value (Meessen (1988) ), is also widely studied for (graph) communication situations. Born et al. (1992) provided a characterization of the position value for (graph) communication situations with trees. An elegant characterization of this rule for arbitrary (graph) communication situations was given by Slikker (2005) . While van den Nouweland et al. (1992) extended the position value to TU-games with hypergraph communication situations, shortly hypergraph communication situations. They also gave an axiomatic characterization of the position value for cycle-free hypergraph communication situations. Algaba et al. (2000) extended the position value to union stable systems and characterized it for a subclass of such systems. However, an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations has not yet been found and remains an open problem. Additionally, the approach of non-axiomatic characterization for the position value, which deserves to be mentioned, was investigated in Casajus (2007) and Kongo (2010) , respectively. Casajus (2007) However, we note that the approach due to Kongo (2010) Slikker (2005) . The partial balanced conference contributions here deals with the payoff difference a player experiences if another player breaks one of his hyperlinks. The intrinsical difference between the two balanced properties is whether the payoff difference of a player experiences is totally or partially attributing to another player. This article is organized as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given in Section 2. Section 3 first introduces the uniform hyperlink game and the k-augment uniform hyperlink game. By using the two games, we give two non-axiomatic characterizations of the position value for hypergraph communication situations. Further, we present a key property, called partial balanced conference contributions. Based on the non-axiomatic characterizations, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations by employing component efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions.
Finally, we conclude in Section 4 with some remarks.
Basic definitions and notation
In this section, we recall some definitions and concepts related to TU-games and allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations.
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function defined on the power set of N such that v(∅) = 0. For any S ⊆ N , S is called a coalition and the real number v(S) represents its worth. A subgame of v with a nonempty set T ⊆ N is a game v T (S) = v(S), for all S ⊆ T . We denote by |S| the cardinality of S ⊆ N . A game (N, v) is zero-normalized if for any i ∈ N , v({i}) = 0. Throughout this paper, we consider only zero-normalized games.
Let Σ(N ) be the set of all permutations on N . For any permutation σ ∈ Σ(N ), the corre-
, where σ i = {j ∈ N | σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of players preceding i in the permutation σ. The best-known single-valued solution, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ), assigns to any game (N, v) the average of all marginal vectors. Formally, the Shapley value is defined as follows.
An alternative description of the Shapley value can be provided by employing the Harsanyi dividends. First, the unanimity game (N, u T ) according to T ⊆ N is the game defined by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0 otherwise (Shapley (1953) ). Then each game (N, v) can be written as a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e., Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi (1959) ) of the nonempty coalition T ⊆ N . The alternative description of the Shapley value is given as follows.
The communication possibilities for a TU-game (N, v) can be described by a (communication) hypergraph ( 
is a 2-uniform hypergraph and in this case these hyperlinks are called links. Therefore, hypergraphs are a natural generalization of graphs in which "edges" may consist of more than 2 nodes.
Let H i be the set of hyperlinks containing player i in a hypergraph (N, H), i.e.
Two nodes i and j of N are adjacent in the hypergraph (N, H) if there is an hyperlink e in H such that i, j ∈ e. Two nodes i and j are connected if there exists a sequence Two values, or allocation rules, were well defined for hypergraph communication situations.
The Myerson value µ (Myerson (1977 (Myerson ( , 1980 , van den Nouweland et al. (1992) ) is defined by
where v H (S) = T ∈S/H v(T ) for any S ⊆ N , and the game (N, v H ) is called the point game or hypergraph-restricted game.
An alternative value for hypergraph communication situations, the position value π (Meessen (1988) , van den Nouweland et al. (1992) ), is given by 
The non-axiomatic characterization of the position value
In order to show the non-axiomatic characterization, we first introduce the uniform hyperlink game induced by an original hypergraph communication situation. The definition of the uniform hyperlink game follows the spirits of the divided link game in Kongo (2010) and the hyperlink agent form (HAF) in Casajus (2007) .
Definition 1. For any (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N without isolated player, its uniform hyperlink game (U (H), w) is defined as follows: Let η(H) denote the least common multiple of the numbers in {|e| | e ∈ H}. Then set
where
By the definitions of (U (H), w), it is clear that U (H) is obtain from (N, H) by expanding each i ∈ N to η(H) · |e| −1 nodes according to each hyperlink e ∈ H i . Every set U (H)(i, e) consists of precisely η(H) · |e| −1 players of U (H) which are obtained by expanding the player i ∈ e in hyperlink e ∈ H i . U (H)(i) is the set of players obtained by expanding i ∈ N in all hyperlinks H i and U (H)(e) is the set of players obtained by expanding the members of e ∈ H.
Therefore, it is easy to check that |U (H)| = η(H) · |H| and |U (H)(e)| = η(H) for any e ∈ H.
Remark. The definition of U (H) is similar to the player set of HAF in Casajus (2007) , but there are no hyperlinks or links in U (H) as defined in HAF, and the characteristic functions are different from each other as well. The characteristic function w here follows the idea from the divided link game, due to Kongo (2010) . The uniform hyperlink game generalizes the divided link game for graph games to hypergraph games.
For a hypergraph game (N, v, H), we present the following characterization of the position value in terms of the Shapley value of the uniform hyperlink game (U (H), w).
Theorem 3.1. For any hypergraph game (N, v, H) and any i ∈ N ,
Proof. Let g be a mapping from Σ(U (H)) to Σ(H): For any two hyperlinks e 1 , e 2 ∈ H and any permutation σ ∈ Σ(U (H)), g(σ)(e 1 ) < g(σ)(e 2 ) if and only if max{σ(l)
otherwise, we have m σ l (U (H), w) = 0. Hence,
So, we have
Note that |e| > 1 for each e ∈ H, so there exist at least two players l, l ∈ U (H)(e) such that w(S ∪ {l}) = w(S) = w(S ∪ {l }) for any S ⊆ U (H) \ {l, l }. So l and l are symmetric in (U (H), w). From the symmetry of the Shapley value, it follows that Sh l (U (H), w) = Sh l (U (H), w) for any two links l, l ∈ U (H)(e). By Eq. (5), for any l ∈ U (H)(e), we have
Note that, for each e ∈ H, |U (H)(e)| = η(H). Therefore, we have
The second equation holds by following Eq. (1). Consequently,
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The following example illustrates the construction of the uniform hyperlink game and Theorem 3.1. U (H) = {(1, e 1 , 1), (1, e 1 , 2), (1, e 1 , 3); (4, e 1 , 1), (4, e 1 , 2), (4, e 1 , 3); (2, e 2 , 1), (2, e 2 , 2), (2, e 2 , 3); (5, e 2 , 1), (5, e 2 , 2), (5, e 2 , 3);
(3, e 3 , 1), (3, e 3 , 2), (3, e 3 , 3); (6, e 3 , 1), (6, e 3 , 2), (6, e 3 , 3);
(4, e 4 , 1), (4, e 4 , 2); (5, e 4 , 1), (5, e 4 , 2); (6, e 4 , 1), (6, e 4 , 2) }.
Note that Figure 1 shows the hypergraph (N, H) and its corresponding set U (H). In the set of By the definition of v, we can calculate the uniform hyperlink game w as follows.
Hence, Sh l (U (H), w) = 1 24 for all l ∈ U (H) and
So, this example shows that the position value can be expressed by the uniform hyperlink game.
By Definition 1 and the proof of Theorem 3.1, we note that η(H) is the key to guaranteeing Eq. (4) in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Clearly, if we consider an integral multiple of η(H) instead of η(H), Eq. (4) is still true. Based on this observation, we can construct the other induced games from the original hypergraph game and describe the position value for the hypergraph game by the induced games.
Definition 2. For any (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and any positive integer k ≥ 1, let η(H) is the least common multiple of the numbers in {|e| | e ∈ H} and ρ(k) = k · η(H). The k-augmented uniform hyperlink game (U (H) k , w k ) is defined as follows.
By the definition of the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, we can obtain the following strengthening of Theorem 3.1. Its proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, so we omit it.
Theorem 3.2. For any (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and any i ∈ N ,
Clearly, when k = 1, the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game coincides with the uniform hyperlink game, and Theorem 3.1 is a special case of Theorem 3.2 as well. This result will serve to characterize the position value axiomatically for arbitrary hypergraph games in the next subsection.
The axiomatic characterization of the position value
In this subsection we provide an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations.
Before we introduce the properties that fully characterize the position value, we first give the following key lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any hypergraph game (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N , any i ∈ N , i ∈ e ∈ H and l ∈ U (H)(e), we have
Proof. To show the result, we distinguish two cases depending on whether or not the least common multiples η(H) and η(H \ {e}) are the same.
Case 1. η(H \ {e}) = η(H).
Then, by Theorem 3.1, we have
Therefore, it is sufficient to show the following equality.
. (10) By the definition of U (H), we have
e ∈ H, where l ∈ U (H)(e). So, for any K ⊆ U (H) \ {l }, it follows from the definition of
This means that the players in
Hence, it is easy to see that
This implies that Eq. (10) holds.
Case 2. η(H \ {e}) = η(H). Since both η(H) and η(H \ {e}) are the least common multiples
of the numbers in {|e | | e ∈ H} and {|e | | e ∈ H \ {e}}, respectively, η(H) = |e| · η(H \ {e}).
Therefore, by Theorem 3.2, we have
where k = |e|. Thus, it is sufficient to show the following equality.
The following proof is similar to the proof described in Case 1, and is left to the reader.
Summing up the two cases, it completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
The position value can be expressed by employing the Harsanyi dividends. Firstly, the uniform hyperlink game (U (H), w) associated with a hypergraph communication situations (N, v, H) can be represented by a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e.,
By Theorem 3.1, the position value for (N, v, H) can be expressed in terms of the unanimity coefficients, i.e., Harsanyi dividends, of the associated uniform hyperlink game. Formally, for any i ∈ N , we have
where K i = K ∩ U (H)(i) and the second equality follows from the alternative description of the Shapley value.
We now give the following properties for an allocation rule f . The first property is a standard property, called component efficiency, which already was used to characterize the Myerson value for communication situations, including graph games, conference structures and hypergraph games (Myerson (1977 (Myerson ( , 1980 and van den Nouweland et al. (1992) ). It was also used to characterize the position value for graph games (Slikker (2005) ) and cycle-free hypergraph games (van den Nouweland et al. (1992) ).
Component efficiency: For any (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and any T ∈ N/H, it holds that
The second property, called partial balanced conference contributions, is developed from the balanced link contributions. The balanced link contributions is used to characterize the position value for graph games in Slikker (2005) and can be expressed as follows.
Balanced link contributions:
For any (N, v, L) and any i, j ∈ N , it holds that
A natural extension of the above property to hypergraph games is the "balanced hyperlink contributions" (or called balanced conference contributions), which can be given by Balanced conference contributions: For any (N, v, H) and any i, j ∈ N , it holds that
However, we note that the obvious extension fails to characterize the position value axiomatically for hypergraph games and this point will be shown in Example 2. For solving the characterization problem of the position value for hypergraph games, we introduce the partial balanced conference contributions. The partial balanced conference contributions also deals with the gains players contribute to each other. When a hyperlink related to a player is broken or built, the threat or contribution of another player received is not only depending on the first player, but also depending on those players whom adjacent to the first player according to the broken or built hyperlink. Formally, the property can be expressed as follows.
Partial balanced conference contributions: For any (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and any i, j ∈ N , it holds
The partial balanced conference contributions states that the contribution or threat from a player towards another player equals the reverse contribution or threat, where the contribution or threat of a player towards another player is the sum of a portion payoff differences a player can inflict on another player by building or breaking one of his hyperlinks. In particular, if H is r-uniform, then the property coincides with the balanced conference contributions. But, in general, this property is obviously different from the balanced hyperlink contributions.
We are ready to show that the position value for the hypergraph games satisfies the two properties we mentioned above. Proof. It has been verified that the position value satisfies component efficiency by van den Nouweland et al. (1992) . We next show that the position value satisfies partial balanced con-ference contributions. Let (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and i, j ∈ N such that i = j. Then we have
where the first equality follows from the definition of U (H)(j, e) and l ∈ U (H)(j, e), the second equality follows from Eq. (14) and Lemma 3.1 (note that λ K (w U (H)\{l} ) = λ K (w) for any
, and the last equality follows from the symmetry of player i and j.
The following example illustrates that the position value satisfies the partial balanced conference contributions.
Example 2. Consider the hypergraph game as described in Example 1. The payoffs for several We now can provide a characterization of the position value by Lemma 3.2. Its proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Slikker (2005) Proof. By Lemma 3.2, it is proved that the position value for hypergraph games satisfies component efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions. It remains to show that the position value is the unique value that satisfies the two properties. Suppose f is an allocation rule satisfies the two properties, we show that f = π. We proceed by induction on |H|. For |H| = 0, the assertion immediately follows from component efficiency. Next we may assume that f coincides with the position value π if |H| ≤ k − 1. We consider the case when |H| = k.
For any component C ∈ N/H, let C = {1, 2, . . . , c}. We can obtain the following system of linearly independent equations by the two properties and the hypothesis, 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we provides the non-axiomatic characterization and axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations. Here the non-axiomatic characterization is in line with the works of Casajus (2007) and Kongo (2010) According to the definitions of the HAF and the uniform hyperlink game, it is easy to check that the differences between the two induced games lies in two aspects: the structures and the characteristic functions. However, somewhat surprisingly, we have the following relationships between them. Even though this corollary shows that the Shapley payoff of the uniform hyperlink game and the Myerson payoff of the HAF coincide with each other, the uniform hyperlink game seems to be more concise than HAF, more importantly, the uniform hyperlink game can provide a powerful assistance in characterizing the position value for arbitrary hyperlink communication situations.
